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Foreword
Nadine Strossen'
The Supreme Court's first decision concerning the First
Amendment in cyberspace, Reno v. ACL U,2 was a landmark ruling,
giving a broad affirmative answer to the question posed by this
Symposium. Rejecting the U.S. Government's argument that online
communications should receive only the truncated First Amendinent
protection that the Court traditionally has meted out to broadcast
communications, all nine Justices agreed that cybermedia should
receive the same full-fledged First Amendment protection as print
media.
Just one week earlier, a federal district judge in New York
issued a ruling3 that is potentially at least as significant in curtailing
government attempts to restrict cybercommunications.4 In upholding
the ACLU's challenge to New York state's Internet censorship law,
Judge Loretta Preska held that the dormant commerce clause doctrine
bars any state or local regulations of the Net, given its inherently
interstate -- indeed, international -- nature.'
The ACLU also has brought and won lawsuits against three
1 Professor of Law, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties
Union. For assistance with this Foreword, Professor Strossen gratefully acknowledges her
Academic Assistant, Amy L. Tenney, and her Research Assistant, Andrew G. Sfouggatakis.
2 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
3 ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The defendants, New York's
Governor George Pataki and Attorney General Dennis Vacco, decided not to appeal from this
ruling. See ACLU Cyberliberties Update, ACLU Victories Final, States Will Not Appeal ALA
v. Pataki, ACLU v. Miller (visited Jan. 7, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/ issues/eyber/updates/
cluoctl7.html#statecdas>.
4 See infra p. 54 statement of Ronald K.L. Collins ("[T]he Pataki case is one of the
most important constitutional cases we have seen in many decades. It certainly belongs in the
casebooks .... ).
5 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173 ("The inescapable conclusion is that the Internet
represents an instrument of interstate commerce ... [so] regulation of the Internet impels
traditional Commerce Clause considerations .... [The New York Act] cannot survive such
scrutiny because it places an undue burden on interstate traffic, whether that traffic be in goods,
services, or ideas."); see also id. at 170 ("The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic
distinctions.").
other state Internet censorship laws.' Moreover, the first lawsuit
challenging a local cybercensorship law, mandating blocking software
on public library computers -- in which the ACLU represented online
speakers whose websites faced blocking -- was likewise held to violate
the First Amendment.7
Despite this perfect courtroom record for freedom of
cyberspeech to date, however, government officials at all levels
continue to devise new schemes for restricting such speech,8 and legal
questions abound as to which such schemes -- if any -- can pass
constitutional muster. Likewise, policymakers and citizens continue
to debate the wisdom or desirability of such schemes in terms of
various concerns, some of which at least appear to be in tension with
each other: for example, parental control and societal protection of
6See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); see also Urofsky v.
Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998); ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M.
1998), appeal docketed, No. 98-2199 (10th Cir. 1998). Georgia declined to appeal the decision
in ACLU v. Miller. See ACLU Cyberliberties Update, supra note 3. Virginia's appeal of the
Urofsky ruling was argued in the summer of 1998. See Virginia Appeals Ruling on Internet
Porn Law (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.freedomforum. org/speech/1998/7/28pom.asp>.
Johnson is currently being appealed by the New Mexico Attorney General's Office. Telephone
Interview by Amy L. Tenney with J.C. Salyer, Justice William Brennan First Amendment
Fellow, ACLU, New York, N.Y. (Jan. 6, 1999).
7 See Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va.
1998). Judge Leonie M. Brinkema held that the library's mandatory blocking requirement
violated the First Amendment rights of the library patrons who initiated the lawsuit, as well as
of the online speakers that the ACLU represented, who were intervenors in the suit. See id. at
570; see also id. at 795 (denying the government's motions to dismiss and ruling that, to sustain
the blocking policy, the government would have to satisfy the heavy burden of proof imposed
under the "strict scrutiny" standard of review, showing that the policy is "narrowly tailored to
achieve" "a compelling governmental interest").
g See generally ACLU Cyberliberties Update (visited Jan. 5, 1999)
<www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/updates.html>. In October, 1998, Congress passed, and President
Clinton signed, a new federal cybercensorship law, the Child Online Protection Act -- dubbed
"CDA II" - which the ACLU promptly challenged in a lawsuit called, appropriately, ACLU v.
Reno II. On November 19, District Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr., issued a temporary restraining
against enforcement of the law. ACLU v. Reno, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18546 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
On February 1, 1999, Judge Reed issued a preliminary injunjction against enforcement of the
law. ACLU v. Reno, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 735 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999). The government
must decide within sixty days whether to proceed with a full trial or appeal the preliminary
injunction. ACLU v. Reno, Round 2: Rejecting Cyber-Censorship, Court Defends Online
"Marketplace ofIdeas" (visited Feb. 3, 1999) <www.aclu.org/features/fl 01698a.html>.
ii
children, 9 other law enforcement goals, business interests in
developing and utilizing new communications technology and in
competing effectively in global markets,"0 and individual interests -- on
the part of minors" as well as adults -- in opportunities to express and
receive a broad, diverse range of ideas and information.
This Symposium draws together leading protagonists in the
past and ongoing struggles to chart the First Amendment regime for
cyberspace, ranging from ACLU lawyers and witnesses in Reno v.
ACLU and state Internet censorship battles, to a Justice Department
attorney and New York District Attorney who played leading roles in
defending Congress's and New York's Internet censorship laws,' 2
respectively. Other participants represent leading creators and
distributors of online communications -- including an executive with
a major media corporation and the director of a large public library
system -- as well as civic organizations that are seeking to shape
government and corporate policies concerning access to various types
of online information, from a range of perspectives. For example,
Parolewatch is seeking to expand Net users' access to information
about violent felons who are in prison but coming up for parole, with
a goal toward prolonging their incarceration. As another example,
Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) seeks to
expand online resources for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered
individuals.
In short, the Symposium speakers are diverse not only in terms
9 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Children's Rights vs. Adult Free Speech: Can They
Be Reconciled?, 29 CONN. L. REv. 873 (1997); Nadine Strossen, Regulating the Internet:
Should Pornography Get a Free Ride on the Information Superhighway?, 14 CARDozo ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 343 (1996).
1o See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Regulating Cyberspace: What Are the Concerns of
the Business Community and Civil Libertarians?, VrrAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, Dec. 15, 1997,
at 153.
1 See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, Schoolgirls, Sex and Speech (visited Oct. 3, 1998)
<http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/98/0618/icopinions2.asp>.
12 See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 ("Jeanine Pirro, the Westchester County District
Attorney, wrote a letter to Governor George Pataki dated February 13, 1996 that similarly
reflects the expectation of the Act's proponents that it would apply to interstate
communications.").
of their legal views and ideological perspectives, but also in terms of
the expertise, experiences, and interests they bring to bear on Internet
free speech issues. In a lively, provocative exchange, the panelists
explore the legal and policy issues with which lawmakers and citizens
are grappling, in trying to chart a course for this new medium that will
respect both individual freedom and community concerns.
The prosecutors on the program argue that, notwithstanding
the judicial rulings to date, uniformly invalidating all challenged
national and state cybercensorship laws, some more narrowly tailored
laws can be devised that should survive constitutional challenges.
Other panelists contend that, even though direct government
regulation of cyberspeech by Congress or state legislatures is
inappropriate, some other types of regulation are appropriate -- for
example, self-regulation by the computer industry, local controls
imposed by community schools or libraries, or monitoring by citizen
organizations. Still other participants maintain that all adults should
have unfettered access to the Internet, and the right to decide for
themselves and their children what to see and what not to see. Finally,
some panelists take a still more libertarian view, concluding that even
parents should be limited in making determinations about Internet
access for their children, and that minors, as well as adults, should
have autonomy in determining which online sites they will and will not
view.
In addition to exploring policy questions about the optimal
balance between individual autonomy and community control, the
panelists also discuss a range of unresolved legal issues that underlie
current and looming court battles about the contours of online free
speech rights:
-- Whether Congress (or other government bodies) may
constitutionally use spending powers to impose restrictions on
cybercommunications - for example, by conditioning the award of
funds to public schools and libraries for Internet access on the
recipients' installation of blocking software;-"
-- Whether Congress (or other government bodies) may
constitutionally subject cybercommunications to regulations
comparable to the "harmful to minors" laws that the Supreme Court
and other courts have upheld concerning other media, and whether
such regulations are technologically feasible;
-- Whether Congress (or other government bodies) may
constitutionally regulate certain commercial cybercommunications, and
whether such regulations are technologically feasible;
14
-- What types of restrictions government may impose on
Internet access in its capacity as employer -- e.g., what restrictions
may state universities impose on faculty members' use of university
computers and networks to access the Internet; 5
-- What type of content-neutral, "time, place, and manner
restrictions" public institutions such as schools and libraries may
impose on users' Internet access;
-- Whether public libraries may require minors to obtain
parental consent before they can access all or some Internet sites
through the libraries;
-- Whether public libraries and/or public schools may install
blocking and filtering software on some or all of their computers with
Internet access;
16
-- Whether public libraries must install blocking and filtering
13 See, e.g., S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998) (the "Internet School Filtering Act,"
sponsored by Senator John McCain, would require blocking software in all federally subsidized
public library and school computers with Internet access). But see ACLU Condemns "Stealth"
Movement of New Net Censorship Bills (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/
news/n072298a.html> (criticizing the McCain legislation as "nothing less than Big Brother in
the classroom"),
14 These issues are presented in the ACLU's challenge to the Child Online
Protection Act, or "CDA II," discussed supra note 8.
15 These issues are presented in Urofsky v. Miller, discussed supra note 6.
16 See, e.g., Censorship In a Box: Why Blocking Software is Wrong for Public
Libraries (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/box.html>; Nadine Strossen,
Filtering Out the Truth (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.intellectualeapital.com/
issues/98/0101/icopinionsl .asp>.
software on some or all of their computers with Internet access;' 7
-- The extent to which parties other than content providers
should be liable for illegal online material -- for example, the extent to
which Internet Service Providers or Bulletin Board Service operators
should be held liable for illegal material to which they provide access;
-- The extent to which filtering and blocking programs, which
are offered by the computer industry with government encouragement
and support, are subject to constitutional challenge, consistent with the
"state action" doctrine;
-- Whether industry self-regulation may be "more dangerous
and more insidious than government regulation;"
8
-- The extent to which filtering and blocking programs, which
are built into a computer system's architecture, effectively depriving
users of the choice not to use such programs, are subject to challenge
under antitrust laws;
-- The extent to which states (or localities) should be able to
pass and enforce laws criminalizing certain online communications that
allegedly harm individuals within the state (or locality), consistent with
the dormant commerce clause doctrine;
-- Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its medium-
specific approach to the First Amendment, 19 given the convergence of
"See ACLU Defends California Library Against Internet Censorship (visited Jan.
5, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/news/n122398b.html> (stating that in October, 1998, the
Alameda County Superior Court dismissed a complaint by a patron of the Livermore Public
Library that the library's policy of providing unfiltered Internet access constituted a public
nuisance). The patron has since filed an amended complaint asserting a constitutional right to
force the library to install blocking software. In response, the ACLU of Northern California filed
a second friend of the court brief in support of the Livermore Public Library's policy of providing
uncensored access to the Internet. See id.
IS See infra p. 76-77 statement of Graham Cannon ("At least with government
regulation, there is due process. You can challenge it and be heard.").
19 Under the current, media-specific regime, print communications -- and now,
thanks to Reno v. ACLU, also online communications - are at the First Amendment apex.
Therefore, some expressions that are perfectly permissible in print or online are outlawed from
the broadcast media. For example, one four-letter word that appears in this Symposium
transcript could well be "bleeped" from a broadcast transmission. See infra p. 53 statement of
Maurice Freedman ("[W]ho needs it?").
media in the Internet context -- e.g., the advent of NetRadio;
-- Whether the Supreme Court should reconsider its "local
community standards" approach to obscenity doctrine, given the
special features of cybercommunications, including the countless
geographical communities through which any Internet communication
may travel and the absence of any tangible, physical impact on those
communities;
-- Even if the current "local community standards" regime is
maintained in cyberspace, whether there should be new, stricter limits
concerning which local communities should be permitted to enforce
their standards;
-- Whether existing laws that protect children against such
crimes as solicitation for sexual contacts, stalking, or child abuse give
prosecutors sufficient tools for protecting children against potential
harm from online communications, or whether any additional, Internet-
specific laws are needed to do so;
-- Whether currently available rating and blocking software
empowers parents, enhancing their ability to make informed choices
about Internet access for their children, or whether instead it limits the
online information available to parents and children;
20
It is particularly ironic that Westchester County District Attorney Jeanine Pirro,
who advocates relegating online communications to second-class First Amendment status, along
with broadcast expression, made statements during the Symposium that could well have been
outlawed as "indecent" or "patently offensive" under the federal and state Internet censorship
laws she supported. (See infra p. 6, describing sexually explicit e-mails between a 51-year-old
male pedophile and a 13-year-old girl, which Pirro argued should be criminalized: "He would
talk about his penis and her vagina. He told her how he was tingling and how his 'Love Bunny'
- a nickname for his penis - wants to meet her vagina").
20 The clumsiness of existing screening software, which blocks many sites from
which most parents probably would not seek to bar their children, was illustrated, ironically, by
a point made by Joe Diamond, Executive Director of Parolewatch. Although Mr. Diamond
advocates the development and use of blocking software, and although Parolewatch has a "law
and order" orientation, he noted that its site is blocked by "a lot of" screening software programs
because it contains the phrase "sex offender." See infra p. 82 statement of Joe Diamond;
Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? How Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch
Free Speech on the Internet (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/issues/
cyber/buming.html>; see also Nadine Strossen, Burning Down the Net (visited Jan. 5, 1999)
<http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/97/1002/ icopinionsl .asp>.
-- Whether future developments in rating and blocking
software technology will increase the ability of such software to
promote parents' informed choices, or whether software is inherently
incapable of performing such a function, given both the inevitable
subjectivity of the evaluations required and the constantly
proliferating, mutating contents of cyberspace;
-- To what extent minors have First Amendment rights of their
own, vis-a-vis not only the government, but also their parents or
guardians;
-- How much autonomy public libraries should have in
determining Internet access policies for adults and/or minors, and to
what extent courts should defer to local libraries when ruling on First
Amendment challenges to their Internet access policies; and
-- How to shape the online intellectual property regime in a
way that respects the public domain, "fair use," and other limitations
on intellectual property rights that are designed to foster free
expression.
The U.S. Department of Justice fought very hard against the
ACLU and other cyberlibertarians in Reno v. ACLU, and vigorously
argued that the Supreme Court should uphold Congress's initial effort
to censor the Internet, the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"). 21
(Likewise, since President Clinton signed the "Child Online Protection
Act" or "CDA II" in October, 1998, the Justice Department has been
defending it against the ACLU's constitutional challenge. 22).
Therefore, it is ironic that the Justice Department attorney who spoke
at this Symposium, Jacob Lewis (who worked on the Reno case),23
21 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (1996).
22 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
23 In fairness, it should be stressed that Mr. Lewis issued the following disclaimer
at the beginning of his remarks: "I must emphasize at the outset [that] the views I express in this
forum are solely my own and don't necessarily correspond in any way to those of the
Department of Justice or the United States Government." See infra p. 9 statement of Jacob
Lewis. It should also be noted, though, that Seth Waxman, who presented the Government's
oral argument in the Supreme Court (and who has subsequently become the U.S. Solicitor
General), subsequently described Reno v. ACLU as "an easy case." Seth Waxman, Remarks
during Panel Discussion, "Can Government Regulate Speech -On the Internet and In Tobacco
Advertising?," Third Annual Conference of the American Bar Association's Forum on
now dismisses the CDA as "obviously unconstitutional., 24 Not only
as President of the ACLU, but also as a taxpaying citizen, I am
perturbed about the squandering of our government's resources -- in
other words, our resources -- in struggling so mightily to defend an
"obviously unconstitutional" law.25 Perhaps Mr. Lewis's statement
reflects the proverbial 20-20 hindsight; certainly, during the legislative
discussion and litigation concerning the CDA, I debated many
government officials and attorneys who seemed sincerely and strongly
to believe that the law should be upheld as constitutional, and that the
Supreme Court would do so. In any event, I do agree with Mr. Lewis
that, despite the ACLU's victories thus far in Reno v. ACLU and the
other Internet censorship cases, the dialogue about on-line free speech
is far from over.26 It continues not only in the legislatures and the
Communications Law (Jan. 24, 1998); see also James Podgers, lnternet Regulation, Round
Three, 84 A.B.A. J. 99 (Mar. 1998) (reporting that Seth Waxman "suggested that the Court may
have struck down the Internet regulations in the Communications Decency Act because they
were as much 'a blunt instrument' as an overly intrusive regulation of free speech").
24 See infra p. 50 statement of Jacob Lewis. Accord, infra p. 56-57 statement of
Dan Burk ("When the CDA was first passed, there were law professor types ... who looked at
the text ... and we said, 'Wow, this is fabulous. If we had sat down and purposely set out to
write a statute that completely violated the First Amendment and will undoubtedly be struck
down by the Supreme Court, we could not ourselves have come up with better language to
accomplish that purpose.' The same could be said for most of other Internet statutes that [the
ACLU has successfully challenged].").
25 See infra p. 43 statement of Ann Beeson ("The New Mexico law.., is word for
word identical to the statute that was struck down in ALA v. Pataki here in New York last year.
If I were a taxpayer in New Mexico I would be outraged by this, as I think all taxpayers should
be, because they continue to have to pay the expenses generated by these clearly unconstitutional
proposals."); see also ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 1029 (D.N.M. 1998) (granting a
preliminary injunction enjoining New Mexico from enforcing its Internet censorship law after
considering the ACLU's motion, live testimony, and counsel's oral arguments); ACLU
Challenges New Mexico Cyber-Censorship Law, Citing Commerce Clause and Free Speech
Rights (visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://www.aclu.org/ news/n042298a.html> (discussing the
ACLU's attempts to persuade the New Mexico State Attorney General to agree to not enforce
the law).
26 See infra p. 51-52 statement of Jacob Lewis.
[O]ne of the concerns [in the Pacifica case, allowing regulation of
broadcast transmissions] was that the material involved would have
an impact on children too young to read .... It's the same thing with
regard to graphic images on the Net .... [T]here will continue to be
legislative efforts to see what can be done with the problems. That
courts, but also in the pages of this Symposium.
dialogue is by no means finished. I am not sure that the five victories
are going to end anything this year. Of course, [the ACLU] should
feel proud ... that you had five victories. You may have to have a
few more, or a few losses, perhaps, before the dialogue is entirely
over.
Id.
